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COMMENTS
"TAKINGS" UNDER THE POLICE POWER-THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION
AS A METHOD OF CHALLENGING ZONING ORDINANCES
by T.S. Baumgardner
The police power of the government to regulate the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare is an inherent element of sovereignty without
which no government could exist.' Blackstone describes the police power as
"the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the individuals of the state, like members of a well governed family, are bound to
conform their general behavior to the rules of propriety, good neighborhood,
and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their
respective stations." ' 2 It is through the police power that the state and its
municipal subdivisions regulate the use of private property by zoning.
Through zoning, a city is divided into districts and different regulations upon
land are prescribed for each district. These restrictions upon an individual
owner's use of his land promote the public welfare by prohibiting uses
incompatible with the use and enjoyment of neighboring lands.
Closely related to police power regulation of land use through zoning is the
power of eminent domain, the power to take private property for public use.
Although the Federal Constitution contains no express grant of this power,
the fifth amendment's prohibition against the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation implicitly recognizes the right of the
3
government to appropriate private property for the benefit of the public.
Provisions requiring just compensation for the taking of private property for
5
public use4 or for a taking or damaging of private property for public use
I. The federal and state governments are sovereigns by virtue of their constitutions. 6 E.
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.02, at 467 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as McQuIL-

LIN]. Thus, the police power inheres in both. However, the federal government rarely chooses to
exercise its power and, accordingly, the police power is generally thought to be reserved to the
states. Id. at 469. In general, municipalities are granted independent sovereignty through state
enabling statutes or "home rule" provisions in state constitutions. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. II,
§ 5 (home rule provision); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65850 (West Supp. 1976) (state enabling statute).
2. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *162.
3. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946).
4. ALA. CONST. art I, § 23; ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 18;CONN. CONST. art. I, § II ; DEL. CONST.
art. I, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 6; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 18; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14; IND.
CONST. art. I, § 21; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 18; ME. CONST. art. I, § 21; MD. CONST. art. III, § 40;
MASS. CONST. Pt. I, art. 10; MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8;N.J. CONST. art. I, §
20; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19; ORE. CONST. art. I, § 13; PA. CONST. art. I, §
10; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 17; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 21; VT. CONST. ch. I,
art. 2; WiS. CONST. art. 1,§ 13. The Kansas Constitution provides for compensation only where a
right of way is taken by a private corporation. KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 4.
5. These provisions are modeled after the Illinois constitution which was amended in 1870
to require compensation when property is either taken or damaged for public use. ILL. CONST.
art. 1, § 15. Those states with "taken or damaged" constitutions are: ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 17;
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15; GA. CONST. art. I, §
2-301; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15; Ky. CONST. § 13; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13;
MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 17; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 14; NEB. CONST. art. 1,
§ 21; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 24; S.D. CONST.
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appear in every state constitutuion except those of New Hampshire and
North Carolina. 6 In the usual case of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain the government institutes proceedings against the landowner for the
purpose of paying the landowner just compensation for the taking of his
property. This procedure is known as condemnation. Typically, the only
issue to be decided by the court in a condemnation proceeding is the amount
of compensation required.
"Inverse condemnation" is the term most commonly used to describe the
remedy of a landowner whose property has been taken or damaged by the7
government without the institution of formal condemnation proceedings.
The word "inverse" is used to describe this form of action because the
landowner, not the sovereign, institutes the proceedings.' Unlike a condemnation proceeding the issue in an inverse condemnation proceeding is not only
the amount of compensation due but also whether there has in fact been a
"taking" requiring compensation.
The availability of the inverse condemnation procedure as a basis for relief
turns upon whether the government's action is classified as an exercise of the
police power which is noncompensable, or as an act of eminent domain, a
"taking," for which the landowner is entitled to compensation. This distinction is especially important where a landowner seeks compensation from the
government for damages sustained as a result of zoning restrictions placed
upon his land. Traditionally, the enactment of building and zoning restrictions
has been considered a proper exercise of the police power 9 which cannot be
attacked upon the ground that the restrictions constitute a taking without
compensation.' 0 This traditionally noncompensable exercise of the police
power is quite similar, however, to the taking of property under the power of
eminent domain for which compensation is required.
This Comment discusses the problems that inhere in attempting to distinguish between exercises of the police power and "takings" under the power of
eminent domain. More particularly, this Comment proposes the availability
of inverse condemnation as a remedy for landowners injured as a result of
zoning restrictions placed upon their property.
art. VI, § 13; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 22; VA. CONST. art. I, § 11; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 16; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 9; WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 33.
6. Neither of these constitutions provides for compensation. N.H. CONST. Pt. I, art. XII;
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17. However, both states have interpreted their constitutions as requiring
compensation for takings. See Kucera, Eminent Domain Versus Police Power-A Common
Misconception, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN I, 24-25
(1959); Note, Eminent Domain-Rights and Remedies of an Uncompensated Landowner, 1962

WASH. U.L.Q. 210.
7. Other terminology has been used to describe this remedy. See, e.g., In rePublic Place, 54
Misc. 2d 69, 281 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1967), rev'don othergrounds, 31 App. Div. 2d 530, 295

N.Y.S.2d 202 (1968), appeal dismissed, 26 N.Y.2d 841, 258 N.E.2d 87, 309 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1970)
(de facto condemnation); Commonwealth Dep't of Highways v. Gisborne, 391 S.W.2d 714 (Ky.
1965) (condemnation in reverse); Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P.2d 647 (1960) (inverse
eminent domain). The Texas courts have uniformly referred to the remedy as inverse condemnation. SeeBrazos River Authority v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 174,354 S.W.2d 99, 104 (196 1).
8. See Note, supra note 6, at 232-36.
9. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1922).
10. See I P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42[10], at 1-189 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
NICHOLS].
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I.

TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF POLICE POWER AND EMINENT DOMAIN

The view that a private property owner who is injured as a result of an
exercise of the police power is not entitled to compensation is justified on the
ground that either the injury is damnum absque injuria" or the owner is
sufficiently compensated by sharing in those general benefits to the community which result from the exercise of the police power. 2 Therefore, from the
perspective of a property owner seeking compensation for injury sustained as
a result of government action, the difference between an exercise of the
police power and a taking under the power of eminent domain is crucial. In
general, eminent domain involves the takingof property needed for public use
whereas the police power involves the regulation of property to prevent an
owner from using the property in a manner that is detrimental to the public
interest. 3 The two are often indistinguishable, however, since a regulation
may have all of the economic consequences of a taking. Eminent domain and
land use restrictions under the police power also resemble each other in that
each power recognizes the superiority of community needs over the selfish
interests of individuals; eminent domain prevents an individual from
obstructing the public interest by refusing to part with his property and the
police power prevents an individual from using his property in a way that is
detrimental to the general welfare of the community. ' As the close relationship of these two powers suggests, to determine when a regulation becomes a
taking is not an easy task.
The police power has often been described as the "least limitable" of the
governmental powers.' 5 An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits
is fruitless for each case turns upon its own facts.' 6 Nevertheless, since the
police power acts as a qualification of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment by permitting a person to be summarily deprived of the beneficial
enjoyment of his property without compensation, notice, or a hearing, the
power must have limits or the protection of the fourteenth amendment is
eliminated. 7 For this reason, some limitations have been placed upon an
exercise of the police power. The police power must be used to promote the
health, safety, or general welfare of the public, 8 and the exercise of the power
must be "reasonable." 19 An exercise of the police power going beyond these
basic limits is not constitutionally permissible. 20 Of course, a problem arises
II. "Loss, hurt, or harm without injury in the legal sense." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 470
(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
12. SeeNICHOLS § 1.42, at 1-109. See also State v. Richards, 157 Tex. 166, 301 S.W.2d 597
(1957); Ellis v. City of West Univ. Place, 141 Tex. 608, 175 S.W.2d 396 (1943); Lombardo v. City
of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475 (1934).
13. NICHOLS § 1.42, at 1-104; see E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 511, at 546-47 (1904).

14. NICHOLS § 1.42[1], at 1-114; seeCity of Fort Worth v. Southwest Magazine, 358 S.W.2d
139 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 914 (1963).
15.

See MCQUILLIN § 24.04, at 473.

16. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 28 (1954). The Court also noted that once the legislature has

spoken, "the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." Id. at 32 (emphasis

added).
17. See Kratovil &Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596,
608 (1954). See also McClain, Modern Concepts of Police Power and Eminent Domain, in
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN

18.

NICHOLS § 1.42[1], at 1- 114to -115.

165, 171-82 (1969).

19. The means used must have a substantial relationship to the objects sought to be

achieved. MCQUILLIN § 24.05, at 478.

20. NICHOLS § 1.42[l], at 1-116 to -121.
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of the police power have been

overstepped.

One of four theoretical factors usually determines the validity of an exercise of the police power: 2' (1)
the physical invasion theory, (2) the noxious
use theory, (3) the diminution in value theory, and (4) the balancing of
interests theory.
Physical Invasion Theory. Early in the history of interpretation of the fifth
amendment's taking clause the Supreme Court recognized that an invasion of
land by water, earth, sand, or other material, or a placing of an artificial

structure which effectively destroyed the land or impaired its usefulness,
constituted a taking for which compensation must be paid. 22 While nontrespassory injuries are often held noncompensable, the courts neverdeny compensation for a physical takeover. 23 Strict application of the physical invasion
theory, however, sometimes led to otherwise unjustifiable results. For example, in United States v. CentralEureka Mining Co. 24 the federal government

closed privately owned gold mines to induce experienced miners into an
essential war effort. The Supreme Court held that this was not a compensable
taking of property as "the Government did not occupy, use, or in any manner

take physical possession of the gold mines or of the equipment connected
with them. "25
Noxious Use Theory. This theory upholds as valid any regulation of the use of
property, even to the point of total destruction of value, so long as the use
prohibited is harmful to others. 26 The first Mr. Justice Harlan outlined this
concept in the landmark case of Mugler v. Kansas. 27 Plaintiff brewery owners
claimed that their property had been taken without compensation as a result
of the enactment of a law forbidding the sale or manufacture of liquor.
Holding that no compensation was required, Harlan made a distinction between noxious and inoffensive uses of property. The abatement of a noxious
use which is harmful to the public is not a taking of property, for no one has a
vested right to injure the public. 2 Therefore, no compensation is required no
21. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1183-84 (1967).
22. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871) (flood control dam caused flooding
of plaintiff's land). See also United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (flooding from government works turned plaintiff's rice plantation into bog); Brazos River Authority v. City of
Graham, 163 Tex. 167,354 S.W.2d 99 (1961) (defendant river authority's operation of dam caused
repeated innundation of plaintiff city's sewage disposal plant). But see Bedford v. United States,
192 U.S.217 (1904). In Bedford the Court denied compensation when revetments erected by the
Government had caused gradual erosion of the plaintiff's land which had been subject to
overflow for a number of years. The Court distinguished Pumpelly and Lynah by noting that in
those cases there had been an actual invasion of the land as opposed to mere consequential
damage. See generallyCormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221,
233-36 (1931); Spies & McCoid, Recovery of ConsequentialDamagesin Eminent Domain, 48 VA.
L. REV. 437 (1962).
23. Michelman, supra note 21, at 1184. See also NICHOLS § 1.42[1].
24. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
25. Id. at 165-66; see Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36,48 (1964), in which
the author cites this case as support for the rejection of the physical invasion theory.
26. See, e.g., Houston & T.C. Ry. v. City of Dallas, 98 Tex. 396,84 S.W. 648 (1905); City of
Houston v. Johnny Frank's Auto Parts Co., 480 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27. 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see Michelman, supra note 21, at 1199 n.72.
28. Note the emphasis on public benefit in the opinion:
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matter how great the economic loss. If the government interferes with harmless uses of property, however, compensation must be paid.2 9
Diminution in Value Theory. This theory is based upon the idea that the
sovereign may not accomplish through the police power that which can be
accomplished only by an act of eminent domain. In simpler terms, private
property cannot be taken by regulation of the sovereign. The theory looks to
the degree of damage to the property owner in order to determine whether
there has been noncompensable damage under the police power or a deprivation of property rights under the power of eminent domain. In the case of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon3' the Court invalidated a state law which
required coal companies owning mineral rights in land to leave pillars of coal
to prevent subsidence of property above the ground. Mr. Justice Holmes, the
main proponent of the diminution in value theory, stated that "[t]he general
rule . . . is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'1 The coal companies' right to the coal in those pillars could not be taken without just
compensation. 32
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community,
cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for
the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use
of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is
only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden
purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests.
123 U.S. at 668-69. See note 32 infrafor a discussion of the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), which follows a similar line of
reasoning.
29. One author has expressed the view that often the issue in this type of case is not one of
noxiousness or harm-creating activity but one of inconsistency between perfectly innocent and
independently desirable uses. See Sax, supra note 25, at 49-50. For example, the author cites
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), in which the complainant was required by law to cut down
his red cedar trees because they produced cedar rust which was fatal to apple trees in nearby
orchards. The Court stated that it did not need to determine whether or not the infected cedars
constituted a nuisance in order to uphold the legislation. Id. at 280. The Court further stated:
The state does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in the judgment of the
legislature, is of greater value to the public. It will not do to say that the case is
merely one of a conflict of two private interests and that the misfortune of the
apple growers may not be shifted to cedar owners by ordering the destruction of
their property; for it is obvious that there may be, and that there is, a preponderant public concern in the preservation of one interest over the other.
Id. at 279. The holding is based upon judicial non-interference with legislative determination of
public interests. See note 34 infra and accompanying text. See also Stockwell v. State, 110 Tex.
550, 221 S.W. 932 (1920).
30. 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE
124-38 (1973); Michelman, supra note 21, at 1190-93; Sax, supra note 25, at 50-60.
31. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
32. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented on the ground that the state had merely regulated a
noxious and harmful use of property. The state had not -taken" any property belonging to the
coal company. To the contrary, the state merely had required the company to leave pillars of coal
in the ground to prevent subsidence damage, a perfectly valid regulation of the use of property
under the police power. "The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The
State does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The State merely prevents the owner from
making a use which interferes with the paramount interests of the public." Id. at 417. See also
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The Court in Goldblatt held valid as a
proper exercise of the police power a town ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavation
within its city limits. Complainants alleged that the ordinance prevented them from continuing
their business and, therefore, constituted a taking of their property without due process of law in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. The Court conceded that the ordinance prohibited the
complainants from continuing their business but found that an ordinance is not necessarily an
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Balancingof Interests Theory. Using this theory, the test of the validity of an
exercise of the police power is whether or not society's need for the measure
outweighs the resulting individual losses. If society's gain is greater, the
exercise of the police power is deemed valid." However, when courts are
confronted with a claim that an exercise of the police power is invalid under
the balancing of interests theory, a presumption arises that, in utilizing the
police power, the legislature or the executive body has already weighed the
competing interests and found in favor of the public. Thus, the courts will
are not in a position to act as a super-legislature and
generally find that they 34
undermine that finding.
II.

MODERN CONCEPTS OF POLICE POWER AND EMINENT DOMAIN

The diminution in value rule stated by Justice Holmes in the Pennsylvania
Coal case took precedence over the other approaches and was the basis for
countless court decisions. 35 As society has progressed, courts have been
faced with "taking" controversies considerably different from that discussed
by Justice Holmes in 1922. New land use regulations such as air easements,
urban redevelopment programs, aesthetic controls, and comprehensive zoning plans have posed significant problems for modern courts.
A.

Pre-1970 Case Law

Air Easements. In United States v. Causby 6 the Supreme Court was faced
with the issue of whether low overhead flights of Army and Navy aircraft

constituted a "taking" of property within the meaning of the fifth amendinvalid exercise of the police power merely because it deprives the owner of his ability to take
advantage of the most beneficial use of his property. Id. at 592. Moreover, the Court was not
impressed by the fact that the ordinance effectively destroyed the commercial value of complainant's property. Although the Court cited Pennsylvania Coalfor the proposition that regulation
cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking which requires compensation, the Court noted that
there was no evidence in the record to show that a prohibition of further mining would reduce the
value of the property in question. Id. at 594. In a similar case, Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36
(1962), the court dealt specifically with the allegation of complainant gravel miners that the
property had no appreciable value for any of the uses for which it was zoned. Dismissing this
contention, the court noted that the legislature had considered a number of uses for which the
property was suited: stablinghorses, cattle feeding, and golf courses. Id.at524, 370P.2dat351,
20 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
33. See City of Houston v. Johnny Frank's Auto Parts Co., 480 S.W.2d 774,779 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (pecuniary loss plaintiffs will suffer from
enforcement of ordinance not so out of proportion to benefit public will receive as to render
ordinance invalid); McClain, supra note 17, at 171-73 in which the author notes that the balancing
test is often used to determine the reasonableness of an exercise of the police power. See also
Michelman, supra note 21, at 1171-72 which argues that the correct test for compensability is
fairness: whether it is fair to proceed with a measure which inflicts private loss without granting
economic relief. A similar view is taken in Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City
Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650 (1958) which advocates an equitable approach to the meaning of
taking.
34. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), in which the Court states that the
legislature or executive body, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public interests to be
served. See also Davis v. City of Lubbock, 16OTex. 38,326 S.W.2d 699 (1959), in which the Texas
Supreme Court held unconstitutional the portion of a statute which provided for judicial review
de novo of an administrative agency's determination of the existence of slum or blight. This
decision is discussed by McClain, supra note 17, at 193-94.
35. - The most recent Supreme Court decision based upon Pennsylvania Coalis Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). Although the decision in Goldblatt applies the diminution in
value theory, the result is exactly opposite from that reached in Pennsylvania Coal. See discussion in note 32 supra.
36. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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ment. The Court of Claims had found that these flights caused the destruction
of the complainants' business and depreciation in the value of their property,
all of which amounted to the taking of an easement by the Government. Since
there were no findings of the nature or duration of the easement taken, the
Supreme Court, on appeal, found that no easement in favor of the Government had arisen. Nevertheless, since complainants had been deprived of the
beneficial ownership of their property, the Court held a "taking" had oc-

curred and the complainants were entitled to compensation." Furthermore, in
Griggs v. County of Allegheny38 the Court made it clear that continuous daily
flights over property can constitute the taking of an air easement for which
compensation is required.3 9
Urban Redevelopment. In Berman v. Parker the Supreme Court was faced
with a challenge to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.41
That statute sought to protect and promote the welfare of the inhabitants of
substandard housing and blighted areas by eliminating injurious conditions
through the use of all means necessary and appropriate, including taking
property for redevelopment under the power of eminent domain. The complainants alleged that their property could not constitutionally be taken for this
project for two reasons: (1) their property was not slum housing and, therefore, they were being deprived of their property without due process of law in
violation of the fifth amendment, and (2) the plan provided that the property,
if taken, would be placed into the hands of a private management agency and
redeveloped for private use and, thus, did not fall within the Government's
power to take private property for public use. 42 Denying plaintiff's claim, the
Court stated that if Congress determines that a beautiful capital would promote public welfare, the judiciary has little power to review that decision.
Moreover, nothing in the fifth amendment stands in the way of the power of
the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy. Thus, if an undertaking is within the authority of Congress, the right
to accomplish it through eminent domain is clear. 43 Berman provides an
excellent example of the use of the police power to determine what is in the
public interest, and of the use of the power of eminent domain to effectuate
that determination. Also, the case, and other cases upholding urban redevelopment programs,4 clearly illustrate the expanding concept of "public
purpose." As one author notes, the test of "actual use" by the public in order
37. Id. at 262; seeThornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100(1962) (compensation granted for taking of land not directly under flight paths of aircraft).
38. 369 U.S. 84 (1962). See generally Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective:
Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 63.
39. The recovery was granted to plaintiffs against the operators of the airport while in
Causby relief was granted against the operators of the aircraft.

40. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
41. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-701 to -719 (1961).
42. 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954).

43. Id. at 33.

44. See, e.g., Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 266 P.2d 105, cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 897 (1954); People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago, 3 I11.
2d 539, 121 N.E.2d 791
(1954); Schenk v. Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31,70 A.2d 612 (1950); Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex.
38, 326 S.W.2d 699 (1959).
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to justify an exercise of the power of eminent domain has been abandoned,
and the test of "beneficial use" to the public has been adopted.45
Aesthetic Controls. Other examples of valid exercises of police power to take
property for the "beneficial use" of the public are controls such as those
which regulate the use of outdoor signs and billboards or the location of
junkyards. Both the California Supreme Court' and the New York Court of
Appeals47 have recognized the validity of regulation of outdoor signs through
amortization of non-conforming uses. A non-conforming use is one which is
permitted by a zoning ordinance to continue notwithstanding the fact that
similar uses are not permitted in the area in which the use in question is
located.48 Under a plan for amortization, however, the non-conforming use is
not permitted to remain indefinitely. The owner is given a fixed time in which
to write off, or amortize, his expenditure in the non-conforming use. After
this time period has expired the use will be prohibited. For example, suppose
a landowner has purchased a billboard upon which he displays advertising
promoting his auto sales business. Shortly after his purchase a zoning ordinance is enacted which prohibits the use in the area of outdoor signs larger
than five square feet. The ordinance, however, provides for amortization of
non-conforming uses by permitting such uses for a period of two years. The
landowner will be allowed to use his sign for two years during which time he
will be able to recoup a portion, if not all, of his investment. Obviously, this is
an excellent resolution of the competing interests of the landowner in receiving the benefit of his investment and the public in eliminating unsightly
billboards from the streets and highways. 49 Similarly, comprehensive plans
with amortization provisions for the elimination of junkyards have become
increasingly common. These plans have been carefully scrutinized by the
courts, however, and held unconstitutional if a reasonable amount of time for
5 °
recoupment of investment is not provided.
B.

Recent Cases

The aforementioned cases disclose a heightened judicial awareness of
aesthetic considerations with respect to constitutional challenges to land use
regulation. The evolution in judicial thinking as to what constitutes a public
purpose continued into the 1970s as public concern over environmental
quality grew and courts became increasingly sensitive to the aesthetic factor
45. See McClain, supra note 17, at 190-91. Seegenerally Benbow, Public Useas a Limitation
on the Power of Eminent Domain in Texas, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1498 (1966).
46. National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, I Cal. 3d 875,464 P.2d 33, 83 Cal. Rptr.
577 (1970), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 946 (1971) (upheld ordinance requiring all billboards in a
certain district to be removed within one year).
47. People v. Goodman, 31 N.Y.2d 262, 290 N.E.2d 139, 338 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972) (upheld
ordinance limiting signs to those not exceeding four square feet in area).
48. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1206 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
49. The idea behind amortization is that the owner of a nonconforming use should be given a
reasonable and definite time in which to recoup his investment. Amortization not only allows the
spreading of any losses which may occur, but also enables the owner of a non-coniforming use to
enjoy, for a time, a monopolistic position by virtue of the zoning ordinance. City of Los Angeles
v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 446 n.2, 274 P.2d 34, 40 n.2 (1954).
50. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953); City of
Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953).
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when deciding "takings" controversies." This increasing awareness may be
attributed to a drawing away from the nineteenth century idea that the only

function of land is to enable its owner to make money.12 Today, all land use is
interrelated; members of a modern society must think in terms of the entire
ecological system.53

As a result of this new awareness, state and regional systems of regulation
have recently been enacted for control of land use on a wide scale. Among the
first of these systems was a comprehensive plan in the San Francisco Bay
area enacted to conserve the shoreline by requiring permits for any project
involving filling or dredging of the bay. In the leading case the plaintiff,
Candlestick Properties, had purchased land submerged at high tide in which
to deposit fill from construction projects. Denied a permit to carry out the
plan, the plaintiff sought damages, contending that the land was suitable for
no other purpose and, therefore, the denial of the permit to fill was tantamount to a taking of property without just compensation. The California

Supreme Court found that the haphazard manner in which the bay was being
filled was inimical to the welfare of both present and future residents of the
bay area. Thus, the restriction imposed did not go so far beyond proper

regulation as to amount to a taking under the power of eminent domain. 54 In a
similar case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld a county shoreland

ordinance restricting the land to certain permitted uses. The court stated that
"[t]he changing of wetlands and swamps to the damage of the general public
by upsetting the natural environment and the natural relationship is not a
reasonable use of that land which is protected from police power regulation." 55 These cases clearly demonstrate an increasing willingness of the
As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
The establishment was entitled, if not required, to consider ecological factors
and, being persuaded by them, to deny that which might have been granted
routinely five, ten, or fifteen years ago before man's explosive increase made all,
including Congress, aware of civilization's potential destruction from breathing
its own polluted air and drinking its own infected water and the immeasurable loss
from a silent-spring-like disturbance of nature's economy.
Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1970).
52. See F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION INLAND USE CONTROL 314-18
(1971). In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,414 (1922), the Court states that "[t]o
make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." See also United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256, 262 (1946), in which the Court found a taking requiring compensation because otherwise "[t]he owner's right to possess and exploit the land-that is to say, his beneficial ownership
of it-would be destroyed."
53. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 52, at 314-18.
54. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 11
Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970). See also Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of
Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (regulation prohibiting
the removal of sand and gravel from wetlands was valid exercise of the police power). But see
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) (ordinance prohibiting filling of marshland when the
land was without value unless filled was invalid exercise of the police power).
55. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972). The court distinguished this type of regulation from a "taking" under the power of eminent domain which refers
to the securing of a benefit not presently enjoyed but to which the public is not entitled. In this
case, however, there was a present right of the public in the shorelands which the ordinance
merely protected from harm. Id. at 771. See also Turnpike Realty v. Town of Dedham, 284
N.E.2d 891 (Mass.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1972) (regulation which prohibited the erection
of any building unless used as an accessory to agricultural, horticultural, or recreational use of
land or water not requiring filling held to be valid exercise of the police power). ButseeDooley v.
Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964), in which the Connecticut
51.
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courts to protect the environment for the good of the public, even at the
expense of the private landowner.
III.

ZONING

By virtue of the common law a landowner has the right to use his property in
any manner that he chooses so long as he does not cause unreasonable harm to
others.16 As one could foresee, this rule made chaos of cities and resulted in a
call for remedial action. The first attempts to organize cities by separating
incompatible uses into different areas involved the use of the power of
57
eminent domain to pay the landowner for the right to establish other uses.
The validity of this method was unquestionable since an identical result could
have been achieved through the use of the police power without the necessity
of giving compensation. Cities soon discovered this and enacted zoning
laws.5 8 At first, many courts struck down these early attempts at zoning as
both violative of due process of law 59 and unconstitutional takings of property
without just compensation. 60
The Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to the validity of zoning
laws as constitutional exercises of the police power to regulate private property in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 61 The case involved a zoning
ordinance which divided the plaintiff's land into three divisions: one allowed
two-family dwellings only, another permitted apartments, hotels, and

churches, and the third provided for industrial uses. Plaintiff alleged that the
land was immediately in the path of progressive industrial development; for
such uses the land had a market value of $10,000 per acre. On the other hand,
if the use were limited to the residential purposes for which the land was
zoned, the market value would not be in excess of $2,500 per acre. 62 Upon
these allegations the plaintiff challenged the ordinance as violative of the
fourteenth amendment. Rejecting this contention, the Court noted that the
increasing concentration of the population in cities had created problems such
Supreme Court held invalid a local flood plain zoning classification. The ordinance listed uses for
the property which included parks, playgrounds, and wildlife sanctuaries. The court found that
these uses restricted the potential buyers of the complainant's property to the town or the
government, thus making the regulation unreasonable and invalid. 197 A.2d at 773.
56. This is the legal maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus. See I W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *306.

57. See Attorney General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899), aff'd, 188 U.S. 491
(1903) (statute restricted height of buildings and provided for payment of damages to any person
owning or having an interest in an uncompleted building damaged by the act and further provided
compensation to all persons sustaining damages to their property by reason of the limitation of
the height of buildings prescribed by the act); State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v.
Houohton, 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1920) (ordinance divided the city into restricted residential
districts and prohibited erection of any other type of building and further provided compensation
to the owner of land in such a district for the restriction imposed).
58. "Zoning" is defined as the division of a city by legislative regulation into districts and the
prescription and application in each district of regulations prescribing the use to which buildings
within designated districts must be put. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1793 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). The
success of zoning in achieving urban organization has been questioned by several commentators.
See generally McDougal, Performance Standards: A Viable Alternative to Euclidean Zoning?, 47
TUL. L. REV. 255, 255-58 (1973).
59. See, e.g., Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130
P. 828 (1913); City of St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217, 147 S.W. 998 (1912).
60. See, e.g., Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 P. 828 (1913); City of St. Louis v. Hill, 116
Mo. 527, 22 S.W. 861 (1893).
61. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
62. Id. at 384.
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as traffic, noise, and general confusion. These conditions, in the Court's
opinion, made restrictions upon the use and occupation of private lands a
necessity. 63 The Court also stated, however, that provisions of an ordinance
as applied to particular premises may be found invalid if clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable.'
65 the Supreme Court made clear that not every
In Nectow v. Cambridge
restriction upon land use would withstand constitutional attack. The plaintiff
had contracted to sell valuable land for industrial use. Subsequently, the land
was rezoned as residential, reducing its value. The Court inquired whether the
health, safety, and general welfare of the inhabitants of the city were promoted by the ordinance in question. Since value to the community by the
restrictive classification was minimal but loss to the plaintiff was serious, the
Court held the ordinance invalid.6
Although the use of zoning has changed considerably since the decisions in
Euclid and Nectow, the fundamental ideas set forth in those decisions form
the basis for most modern zoning decisions. As the Court pointed out in
Euclid, although the meaning of a constitutional guarantee never varies, the
scope of its application must expand or contract to meet the new and different67
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of its operation.
Therefore, although the fifth amendment protection against the taking of
private property for public use can never be disregarded, the protection must
be interpreted flexibly in light of the changing conditions of society. As
society has progressed, zoning restrictions have become more sophisticated
and have been used for purposes other than those upheld in Euclid. The
courts have been called upon to determine the validity of these innovative
zoning restrictions in the light of present conditions. Examples of the current
trend may be seen in the reaction of the courts to two modern uses of zoning:
phased zoning and zoning for the preservation of natural resources.
A. Phased Zoning: A Question of Timing
In the classic case of Arverne Bay ConstructionCo. v. Thatche,'8 the New
York Court of Appeals was faced with a challenge that restrictions placed
upon the plaintiff's property by a zoning ordinance resulted in a deprivation
of property without due process of law. Plaintiff desired to build a filling
station upon land which was zoned for residential purposes only. The undisputed facts showed that the land in the area had long been vacant due to the
location of an incinerator and a sewer in the immediate vicinity. The court
found that the plaintiff's property could not be used profitably at that time or
in the immediate future for residential purposes. Although acknowledging
that temporary hardship or inconvenience of the individual in holding unproductive property might ultimately be compensated by the benefit to the
public, the court nonetheless determined that an ordinance which perma63. Id. at 392-93.
64. Id. at 395.
65. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
66. Id. at 188-89.
67. 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
68. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
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nently restricts property so that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking. 69 Therefore, the
restriction was held invalid.
There may be a better solution to the problem presented in Arverne Bay.
The court might have applied the amortization principle used in the sign and
billboard cases. To illustrate, assume that the expected population expansion
into the neighborhood of the plaintiff's filling station would take ten years.
Through use of the amortization principle the plaintiff could build a filling
station and amortize its cost over ten years. At the end of ten years the
landowner would be required to convert the land to residential use.7" This
result is a more equitable resolution of the competing interests between the
landowner and the public.
In a more recent case, Golden v. PlanningBoard,7 the court which decided
Arverne Bay upheld a zoning regulation which timed zoning for residential
development to coincide with the availability of municipal services. The case
apparently was distinguishable from Arverne Bay as the restrictions placed on
the property in question were not permanent.7 2 Although the issue of the
validity of timing residential development is central in both cases, the court
evidently determined that the restriction in Golden was not of sufficient
duration for the court to find a taking. This decision appears correct. If an
owner is forced merely to postpone plans for development of land, to hold the
restriction invalid and thereby nullify the purpose of the ordinance would be
unwise.
B. Zoning for Preservationof NaturalResources
Zoning ordinances which restrict the erection of buildings have recently
become widely used as a method of preserving the natural state of the
environment. The most interesting case involving this type of zoning restriction is Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of ParsippanyTroy Hills.7 a Complainant owned a large tract of industrially zoned land and a
smaller adjoining tract which was within a "meadow" zone restricted to
agricultural, conservational, recreational, and like uses. Complainant began
filling the smaller tract of land in violation of the ordinance. Upon a denial of a
request for a permit to continue such operations, complainant filed suit
alleging that the "meadow" zoning provisions amounted to a taking of property without compensation. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the
main purpose of the zoning was the preservation of the natural state of the
meadows, and the secondary purpose was the utilization of the land as a flood
water detention basin. Both benefited the public.74 Although the line between
regulation and taking is a matter of degree, when the purpose and effect of a
regulation is to appropriate private property for open space or for a flood
69. Id. at 233, 15 N.E.2d at 592. "The only substantial difference, in such case, between
restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of
payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden." Id.
70. See J. BEUSCHER, LAND USE CONTROLS-CASES AND MATERIALS 387 (3d ed. 1964).
71. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
72. Id. at 380-81, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
73. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
74. 193 A.2d at 240.
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control purpose, the line has been crossed.7 5 Thus, the court found that the

complainant had been deprived of the beneficial use of his property, a
76
deprivation amounting to a taking.

The court in Parsippany-TroyHills was aware of the possible impact of this
decision. To hold the zoning restrictions invalid would leave the land unregulated, thereby allowing the owner to use the land as he saw fit. This result
would have proven damaging to the public interest. Accordingly, the court

directed that the judgment not become effective for such a period of time as
the trial court should find reasonably necessary to enable the enactment of
proper regulations for the area. 77 This farsighted approach to the problem

allowed the court to reach a solution which was fair to both the landowner and
the public.
IV.

INVERSE CONDEMNATION

Inverse condemnation has become a useful remedial device for landowners

injured as a result of government action. Therefore, most courts have
reasoned that the just compensation clause is self-executing and necessarily
implies a waiver of sovereign immunity.7 8 This interpretation provides landowners an effective means of bringing a cause of action against the sovereign

state.7 9 Furthermore, although the action of inverse condemnation originated
in cases concerning the diversion of riparian rights,80 courts have moved away
from the primitive position which required a physical invasion or taking and
now recognize that loss of intangible property interests may provide a basis
for a landowner to claim the fifth amendment right to just compensation. 8
A.

TraditionalRemedies for the Injured Landowner

Traditionally, a landowner has been able to challenge a regulatory ordinance by alleging that its provisions are arbitrary, unreasonable, or have no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. A
landowner's motive for challenging an ordinance was often his unwillingness
to comply with it.82 Thus, the nullification of the offending regulation has
been accompanied by the issuance of an injunction against continued
enforcement.83 Injunction cases often contain dictum stating that the particu75. Id. at 241.
76. The court, however, does not specify whether the decision to strike down the zoning
ordinance was primarily based upon the ground that the ordinance deprived the complainant of
any economic return on the property or on the ground that the ordinance was designed to promote
a purely municipal purpose. See A. GOLDBERG, ZONING AND LAND USE 235 (1972).
77. 193 A.2d at 244.
78. See Note, Constitutional Law-Eminent Domain-Constitutional Provision Requiring
Just Compensationfor Taking or Damaging Private Property Is Not Self-Executing, 36 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 213, 214 (1961). See generally NICHOLS § 3.2, at 3-43.
79. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity the sovereign may not be sued except to the
extent that it has consented to be sued. However, the government is not immune from suits based
upon the Constitution. This applies to both federal and state governments.
80. See Note, Inverse Condemnation, 3 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 173 (1968);
City of New York v. Pine, 185 U.S. 93 (1902); Westphal v. City of New York, 177 N.Y. 140,69
N.E. 369 (1904).
81. Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Powerand Eminent Domain
by the Courts: So-called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1968 URBAN L. ANNUAL I, 14.
82. See, e.g., Kissenger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958);
Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957).
83. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Stockwell v. State,
110 Tex. 550, 221 S.W. 932 (1920).
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lar police power action being declared invalid and enjoined was a taking
requiring just compensation. s No compensation was ordered in these cases,
however, since that was not the remedy requested.
Significant dictum from the Supreme Court in controversies concerning
police power regulations has laid the foundation for claims of compensation
for injuries suffered as a result of excessive regulation. 5 In United States v.
CentralEureka Mining Co.8 6 the plaintiff sought to recover damages incurred
as a result of wartime regulations prohibiting the operation of a gold mine.
Concluding that the regulations did not constitute a taking when considered in
light of the need for strict economic controls during wartime, the Court set
forth the following principles:
Traditionally, we have treated the issue as to whether a particular
governmental restriction amounted to a constitutional taking as being a
question properly turning upon the particular circumstances of each
case. . . . In doing so, we have recognized that action in the form of
regulation can so diminish the value of property as to constitute a taking. . . . However, the mere fact that the regulation deprives the property owner of the most profitable use of his property is not necessarily
enough to establish the owner's right to compensation. . . . In the
context of war, we have been reluctant to find that degree of regulation
which, without saying so, requires compensation to be paid for resulting
losses of income.8 7
This language compels the conclusion that damages were disallowed in this
case because of the necessity for strict economic regulations in time of war.
Yet, the Court recognized that a regulation which merely inflicts economic
harm can be so unreasonable as to constitute a taking requiring compensation.
B. Policy Considerations
The notion of expanding the concept of inverse condemnation so as to
provide a remedy for those injured as a result of zoning restrictions has
provoked wide discussion of policy considerations.
Arguments for Allowing Inverse Condemnation in Zoning Cases. Since individual losses resulting from zoning restrictions are quite frequent and often
devastating, private landowners look to the courts for redress. To allow these
injured persons the remedy of inverse condemnation is attractive for several
reasons:. the remedy implements the purpose of the fifth amendment, 8
reduces pressures on landowners and courts to upset comprehensive zoning,
achieves a "fair" outcome, and deters arbitrary action of officials responsible for zoning.
84. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922).
85. The Court has often stated that police power regulations can be so excessive or

unreasonable as to constitute a taking for which compensation is required. See, e.g., Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,594 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,266 (1946);

United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.

Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The idea of landowner election to recognize the invalid regulation as
a taking and seek compensation was first raised in Note, Eminent Domain-When Is Property
Taken-Allegation that Wartime Shutdown OrderWas ArbitrarySupports Claim for Compensation, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1134 (1953).
86. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
87. Id. at 168.
88. This, of course, also applies to just compensation provisions in state constitutions.
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The fifth amendment guarantee that private property shall not be taken for
a public use without just compensation was designed to bar government from
forcing some people to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole. 89 The policy underlying the eminent
domain provision is the distribution throughout the community of the loss
inflicted upon the individual by the making of public improvements.' Since
zoning is enacted for the public benefit, a zoning ordinance which results in
the taking of private property should be subject to attack in the same manner
as any other taking of private property for public use.
Under traditional remedies, if the government imposes a burdensome
zoning regulation on land use, the individual landowner seeks a judicial
determination that the regulation cannot be applied to his land. If the landowner is successful, the land goes completely unregulated.91 Since the landowner is free to do as he pleases, the result could be the destruction of a
comprehensive zoning plan. If inverse condemnation were allowed, both the
pressure on the owner to have the land declared unrestricted and the pressure
on the courts to allow the owner to use the land would be reduced.92
Moreover, inverse condemnation would allow monetary compensation for
loss of the profitable use of land, and the courts would no longer be forced
into judicial zoning in order to compensate the landowner for the loss of the
beneficial use of the property.
The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from basic equitable principles of fairness as from technical concepts of
property law. 93 Traditional remedies force the courts into an either/or situation. The court must either rule for the landowner by declaring the regulation
invalid or uphold the regulation and leave the landowner without compensation. Inverse condemnation would allow courts to achieve a result which is
94
fair to the individual as well as to the general public.
As long as the property of an individual can be regulated without cost to the
general public, the consequences of the regulation are not likely to be considered when making the zoning decision. 95 If administrators and citizens are
aware, however, that a landowner may be able to compel the government to
pay for the restriction, they will be forced to weigh the benefits of the
restriction against the cost which must be borne to achieve those benefits. If
inverse condemnation is extended to allow compensation for injuries sustained as a result of zoning restrictions, then the true cost of the regulation in
89. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). The language of the fifth amendment
requirement of just compensation is derived from the Magna Carta. However, the legislative
history concerning the motivation behind the addition of the clause in the fifth amendment is
scant. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BARTA, supra note 30, at 99-104; Lenhoff,
Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 596 (1942); Stoebuck, A
General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972).
90. Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943).
91. See Dunham, From Rural Enclosure to Re-Enclosure of Urban Land, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1238, 1253 (1960).
92. Id.
93. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973).
94. As stated by Mr. Justice Holmes, "we are in danger of forgetting that a strong public
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
95. Dunham, supra note 91, at 1253.
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light of the benefit to the public is more likely to be reflected in the zoning
decision.'
Arguments Against the Extension of Inverse Condemnation to Zoning Cases.
Those who disfavor expanding inverse condemnation as a remedy for landowners injured by zoning point to the possibility of several undesirable
consequences of the remedy in the zoning context: (1) the threat of damage
suits would deter efficient land use planning, (2) excessive financial demands
would be made upon municipalities, and (3) annual budgeting processes
would be upset by uncertainty.
A municipality is authorized to exercise police power to promote the public
health, safety, or general welfare. The opponents argue that a municipality
must be free to exercise this authority in the form of zoning regulations
without incurring liability should exercise of that authority later prove erroneous.97 If landowners are allowed to recover damages from municipalities as a
result of unduly burdensome zoning restrictions, then necessary public action
might not be taken by a municipality.98 A similar burden would be placed upon
a municipality forced to compensate landowners for losses resulting from
zoning restrictions. If a large area of land is involved in the zoning regulations,
disgruntled landowners could combine and bring so many inverse condemnation suits that a municipality would be financially unable to make the necessary payments. Thus, the entire scheme of land use controls could be
destroyed. 99 Moreover, in most zoning cases the placement of the landowner
in his pre-zoning position by the issuance of an injunction is a sufficient
remedy. 100
If landowners were allowed to use inverse condemnation to attack zoning
ordinances, legislative control over the allocation of financial resources
would be reduced. The plaintiff, in choosing either the injunctive or compensatory form of relief, would exercise control over the expenditure of public
funds.' 0' Furthermore, a public agency choosing to proceed by regulation
only is entitled to be judged upon this basis. 10 2 The government should not be
allowed through inverse condemnation to purchase compliance with unauthorized regulations. 103
C.

Case Law Concerning the Availability of Damages
in Zoning Litigation

Several jurisdictions have been faced, either directly or indirectly, with the
question of whether to allow inverse condemnation as a remedy for excessive
zoning restrictions. The most recent and most interesting confrontation with
Id. at 1254.
See Cabaniss, Inverse Condemnation in Texas-Exploringthe Serbonian Bog, 44 TEXAS
L. REV. 1584, 1601 (1%6); Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the
Validity of a Zoning Ordinance,26 STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1450 (1974). See also Beuscher, supra
note 81, at 12-13.
98. Cabaniss, supra note 97, at 1601.
99. 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 159.18, at 386 (1975).
100. See Note, supra note 97, at 1452.
101. Id. at 1450.
102. Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The ConstitutionalLimits of Public Responsibility,
1966 Wis. L. REV. 3, 48.
103. See Note, supra note 85, at 1135.
96.
97.
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the inverse condemnation question in zoning litigation arose in the state
courts of California. The controversy centered on "down-zoning," or rezoning into a less profitable classification. In 1966 the plaintiff-landowners
purchased commercially zoned property in the city of Cerritos for the purpose of constructing a shopping center. In July 1971 the city declared a
moratorium with respect to the use of certain zone categories in order to
re-study land use policies. In October 1971 the city adopted a general zoning
plan which designated the plaintiffs' property for neighborhood commercial
use. Thereafter, the plaintiffs submitted plans to the city for development of
the land as a shopping center and requested that the commercial zone be
reinstated. In July 1972 the city rejected the proposed plans and rezoned the
property as low density, single family residential property, an action which
allegedly caused a fall in the market value of the property from $400,000 to
$75,000. Furthermore, the size, shape, and location of the property allegedly
rendered it useless for single family residential purposes. The city's demurrer
to plaintiffs' complaint in inverse condemnation was sustained by the
Superior Court, Los Angeles County, and the plaintiffs sought a writ of
mandamus directing the lower court to overrule the demurrer. The court of
appeals ruled for the landowners and held that in certain cases even a valid
exercise of a city's zoning power could invoke the application of the principle
of inverse condemnation. 104 The Supreme Court of California reversed,
holding that inverse condemnation lies only for a taking or damaging of
property and plaintiffs had not alleged facts to support such a claim. 105 The
decision rested upon several major grounds: (1) a purchaser of land merely
acquires a right to continue a use instituted before the enactment of more
restrictive zoning, 106(2)diminution of market value does not constitute "damage" in the constitutional sense,°107 (3)the appropriate method of challenging a
general zoning plan is by a proceeding in mandamus, not through an action for
damages, 10 8 and (4) legislative, rather than judicial, action holds the key to
reform in the area of just compensation. 109 In this case the court attempted to
justify its decision by finding that the landowners had no property interest in
the industrial zoning classification. Therefore, when the industrial classification was lifted from the property, and a more restrictive and less profitable
classification placed upon it, no "taking" of property occurred for which
compensation is required.
The finding that the landowners had no property interest allowed the court
to deny compensation under the state constitution which provides for compensation whenever property is taken or damaged. In this case, however, the
plaintiffs suffered a real and substantial injury as a result of the down-zoning.
104. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 908, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436, 444 (1974).
105. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 520, 542 P.2d 237, 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365,
373 (1975).
106. Id. at 516, 542 P.2d at 242, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 370. The court's view is that a zoning
classification is not property which can be "taken or damaged" in the constitutional sense.
107. Id. at 518, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
108. Id. at 518-19, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 371, 372.
109. Id. at 521-22, 542 P.2d at 246-47, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75. SeeF. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES
& J. BANTA, supra note 30, at 267-83, where the authors discuss the British system of compensation provided in the Town and Country Planning Act. See generally Berger, A Policy Analysis of
the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 165 (1974).
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The fact that the plaintiffs may share in the general benefits resulting from the
zoning ordinance obviously offers them little solace. The courts could fashion
a more equitable solution in cases such as this by allowing the plaintiffs
limited compensation. For example, the plaintiffs in the above case could
have been allowed to recover damages in the amount of the difference
between the original price of the land, $100,000, and the current selling price,
$75,000, making the total recovery $25,000. This "out-of-pocket" type of
compensation would allow the plaintiffs to shoulder a $300,000 "loss" of the
difference between the market value of the land as industrially zoned and the
price which they paid for the land. By allowing limited recovery of damages,
the plaintiffs would not be forced to suffer more than their share of the cost of
the public benefit.' 10
In City of Miami v. Romer,' a Florida case, the plaintiff sued to recover
compensation for a ten-foot strip of land on a lot which was restricted by a
set-back ordinance. The plaintiff alleged that the purpose of the ordinance
was to prevent construction of buildings so that the city could ultimately
acquire the property without paying for the improvements. The Supreme
Court of Florida found that the establishment of set-back lines by a municipality was a proper exercise of the police power, but also stated that if the
set-back ordinance were enacted without regard to the public health, safety,
or general welfare, the only question remaining would be whether a deprivation of the owner's beneficial use of the property amounted to a "taking" of
the strip for which compensation was required." 2
A recent appellate court decision held that the enactment of a zoning
ordinance under the police power does not entitle the property owner to seek
3
compensation through inverse condemnation for the taking of the property. 1
Interestingly enough, the court cites City of Miami v. Romer as supporting
this statement. The court further stated that if the ordinance as applied to the
property involved is arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, or confiscatory, the relief available to the property owner is a judicial determination that
4
the ordinance is invalid.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey rendered a unique decision in Lomarch
Corp. v. Mayor & Common Council."5 The controversy arose when the city
enacted an ordinance which in effect placed a one-year freeze upon construction in a proposed subdivision pending a decision by the city on whether to
condemn the property for a public park. The plaintiff landowner brought suit
to declare the ordinance invalid as violative of both the federal and state
constitutions in that the ordinance did not provide for compensation. The
court held that the ordinance would be unconstitutional if it did not provide
for compensation." 6 The court stated, however, that when the constitutional110. See City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969), in which "zoning with
compensation" was accomplished by way of azoning ordinance which restricted all buildings in a
subdivision to single family occupancy and provided compensation for damage resulting from the
zoning to those who held multiple family dwellings.
111. 73 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954).
112. Id. at 287; see Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Damages-A New Cause of Action,
5 URBAN LAW. 25, 46-47 (1973).
113. Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. App. 1973).

114. Id.

115. 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968); see Badler, supra note 112, at 44-45.
116. 237 A.2d at 884.
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ity of such an ordinance is challenged, the ordinance will be upheld upon an
implied duty to make payment of adequate compensation to the landowner
for the temporary taking of the property. The court recognized the severe and
somewhat arbitrary restriction that had been placed upon the landowner's
right to use the property, but also recognized the public concern in prohibiting
construction upon the lands to be condemned for park purposes in the future.
The building restrictions in Lomarch were placed on the land so that the
city, if it decided to condemn the land for a park, would not have to pay for
improvements to the land. No one would question the legitimacy of this
reasoning. It seems unfair, however, to force the landowner to hold his
property unproductive and pay his property taxes while the city takes its time
in determining whether to condemn the property. By allowing the landowner
adequate compensation for the temporary taking of the property, the city's
objectives in enacting the ordinance are satisfied without injuring the landowner in the process.
The most recent case in Pennsylvania concerning the availability of inverse
condemnation to one injured by a zoning ordinance is Gaebel v. Thornbury
Township."7 The plaintiffs owned commercially zoned land which was
rezoned as a flood plain, thereby limiting the land to agricultural, horticultural, and recreational uses. The plaintiffs alleged that the restrictions
imposed by the amended ordinance constituted a taking of property without
just compensation. Therefore, the plaintiffs petitioned under statutory eminent domain provisions for appointment of viewers to ascertain and award
just compensation."18 Statutory procedures were also available for challenges
to the validity of any provision of a zoning ordinance. 9 Although the court
recognized that a regulation may be so unreasonable as to constitute a taking
of private property which can only be effectuated through eminent domain,
the court stated that such was not the issue presented. The true issue was
whether the plaintiffs' exclusive recourse to challenge the zoning ordinance
was through the procedures established by statute for such a challenge. The
court held that the plaintiffs would have access to the remedy of inverse
condemnation in only one circumstance: when a township under the power
of eminent domain substantially deprived the plaintiffs of the beneficial use
and enjoyment of their property. 120 A dissenting opinion agreed with the
majority that a challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance must be carried
out through the exclusive remedies provided. The plaintiffs, however, were
not challenging the validity of the ordinance involved. According to the
dissent, the question was whether the zoning ordinance was a valid police
power regulation or whether the ordinance was a taking of the plaintiffs'
property without compensation. 2 ' Since the judicial relief provided in the
statutory zoning appeal proceeding is modification or nullification of the
offending ordinance,' 122 the majority opinion obviously side-stepped the question directly presented by the plaintiffs.
117. 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 379, 303 A.2d 57 (1973).
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-502(a) (Supp. 1976-77).
119.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11001-11 (1972).

120. 303 A.2d at 60.
121. Id.at 62.
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (1972).
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A somewhat peculiar fact situation gave rise to judicial determination of the
availability of damage suits for landowners in Texas. After the plaintiff began
construction of a building the city claimed that this construction was in
violation of city zoning ordinances and obtained a restraining order and
temporary injunction against further construction. The city's action was later
declared erroneous.' 23 In the meantime, the plaintiff's construction project
had been delayed almost two years. The plaintiff brought suit to recover from
the city the damages incurred as a result of this delay. The Supreme Court of
Texas held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, 21 4 reasoning that since
the city was exercising a lawful right to enforce ordinances, the fact that the
ordinance was later determined invalid did not allow the plaintiff to recover
damages. The court, however, limited the holding to situations where the
ordinance was not unreasonable or void on its face. 25 In another Texas case,
Kirschke v. City of Houston,126 the plaintiffs were denied a building permit to
construct a public garage because the property was to be used for a public
highway. After three years, however, the city had neither instituted condemnation proceedings nor lifted the "freeze" upon the plaintiffs' property. The
plaintiffs brought suit for damages, alleging that the denial of the permit and
the city's inaction manifested an intention to subject the property to public
use and amounted to a taking. The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled
to obtain relief by mandamus or mandatory injunction requiring the city to
issue the requested permit, but were not entitled to recover damages or
compensation since an actual taking or even damage to the property had not
occurred. 127 The court in this case missed the mark if it was attempting to
achieve a fair result. If the city had a valid reason for denying the permit, the
intention to build a highway upon the land, then requiring the city to issue the
requested permit made little sense. Upon commencement of the highway
construction the city would be forced either to pay the plaintiffs the value of
the land with the garage, or to reroute the highway. Although the court
recognized the injustice of requiring plaintiffs to wait until the city condemned the property, the court failed to utilize the best solution: to pay the
owners for the temporary taking of the property.
In recent years the Federal District Court for the District of Nevada has
been confronted with controversies arising from land use regulations in the
Lake Tahoe Basin. In Brown v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency'28 the
plaintiffs challenged a land use regulation which zoned lands as forest and
recreational districts. The plaintiffs alleged that the restrictions made the land
unavailable for any private beneficial use and amounted to the dedication of
the lands to the public for use as parks or general recreational areas. The court
123. City of West Univ. Place v. Ellis, 134 Tex. 222, 134 S.W.2d 1038 (1940).
124. Ellis v. City of West Univ. Place, 141 Tex. 608, 175 S.W.2d 396 (1943).
125. Id.at 612, 175 S.W.2d at 398.
126. 330 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
939 (1961).
127. Id. at 634. But see City of Abilene v. Bailey, 345 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in which the court allowed recovery of damages for the diminution in
value of the plaintiff's property caused by obnoxious odors and insects from the city's sewage
plant. See Note, Condemnation Blight and the Abutting Landowner, 73 MICH. L. REV. 583, 601
(1975).
128. 385 F. Supp. 1128 (D. Nev. 1973).
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stated that public welfare and necessity may reasonably require exceptionally
restrictive land use classifications for the protection of public interests in the
Lake Tahoe Basin, but that such valid regulations may, nevertheless, constitute a taking of private property for public use, entitling the owner to just
compensation. 2 9 In a later case, 1 30 however, the court found that allegations
that the improvement district had imposed special assessments and ad
valorem taxes on property based upon pre-zoning ordinance classifications
had failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality of the ordinance and
failed to establish a cause of action for inverse condemnation. 131 This ruling
was based primarily upon the ground that the standards of pleading to which a
complaint is held on a motion to dismiss are more stringent when the complaint challenges a presumptively constitutional act. Thus, the plaintiffs'
allegations of loss in value of the property were insufficient alone to support
the claim of an unconstitutional taking. These cases indicate that this court
would uphold a landowner's suit in inverse condemnation for recovery of
damages incurred as a result of valid zoning restrictions placed upon property
for the purpose of conservation and natural resources preservation. Such a
result appears fair to all concerned. The public has a definite interest in
preserving natural resources, but restrictions placed upon land in order to
achieve this result often are found to be unreasonably harsh and, accordingly,
are held invalid. This could have the detrimental effect of forever destroying
the area's natural beauty. If the landowner is allowed to recover damages,
however, then he will neither destroy the environment nor suffer the entire
cost of preserving it.
V.

ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL REMEDIES

The conclusion to be drawn from "takings" decisions is clear: The courts
are not anxious to allow recovery of damages against governmental agencies.
As has been demonstrated, however, the courts are often willing to declare an
excessive zoning restriction an unconstitutional taking of property without
just compensation and then place an injunction upon enforcement of the
ordinance. This judicial attitude must lead to undesirable results. Restrictions
placed upon property to preserve the natural state of the environment provide
the most obvious example. If the ordinance is upheld, the landowner is, in
effect, forced to dedicate the land to public use. If the restriction is declared
invalid, however, and the landowner is allowed the beneficial use of the
property, the public interest in natural beauty is subordinated. A solution may
be found in a balancing of interests approach. Unfortunately, the courts,
although expressing hopes of reaching a "fair" decision by balancing the
interests of the landowner and the public,' 3 2 have refused to reach a compromise between these interests. Generally, if the interest of the landowner in
the beneficial use of the property is greater than the public interest in the
129. Id. at 1132. The plaintiffs did not recover damages, however, since they failed to exhaust
the administrative remedies provided in the ordinance.
130. Western Int'l Hotels v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 387 F. Supp. 429 (D. Nev.
1975).
131. Id.at 437.
132. See, e.g., note 33 supra.
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zoning restriction, a court will declare the regulation invalid and issue an
injunction against enforcement. Yet, a strong public interest in enforcement
of an ordinance will lead a court to uphold the ordinance despite its burden
upon an individual landowner. This all or nothing approach accomplishes
little in the way of fairness, and the courts would do well to strike a balance.
Rather than simply allow either the landowner or the public to "win" or
"lose," each could "win" and "lose" a little. A good example of this
balancing approach is the Lomarch decision in which the court required the
public to pay for the benefits received as a result of excessive regulations
rather than allowing the landowner the free and uncontrolled use of the
33
property.
Although Lomarch gives equal weight to both individual and societal
needs, the decision is only one ray of the spectrum of solutions available
through an innovative balancing of interests. For instance, the payment of
damages is not necessarily required. In the Parsippany-TroyHills decision,
for example, the court ordered the zoning authority to reassess policies and
formulate zoning consistent with the interests of both the public and the
landowner.134 Other examples are the billboard and junkyard cases which
show that fairness can be achieved without the payment of damages through
the use of amortization.' 35 Of course, amortization cannot be used in every
situation. In the HFH, Ltd. case, for example, to allow the landowners to
construct an entire shopping center and then "phase out" individual stores
through amortization would have been ridiculous. The proposed alternative
of limited compensation to the landowner is, thus, a further example of a way
to achieve a fair result in situations which involved a clash between public and
private interests.
As the preceding discussion suggests, the judiciary could take a more active
role -in "takings" controversies. However, there are drawbacks to this
approach. Judicial attempts to achieve a fair result in each case undermines
predictability of outcome in the system. If carried to an extreme, each
landowner could be required to litigate each individual claim, thereby increasing the responsibilities of already overburdened courts. Nevertheless, zoning
litigation based upon constitutional "taking" allegations is already frequent,
and, as in any common law evolution, patterns ultimately will develop. In
addition, legislation defining the respective rights of the landowner and the
public, and providing equitable remedies should those rights be infringed,
could eradicate many of these problems. 13 6 Yet, appeals to the legislature
encouraging correction of the defects of the present system have gone unan133. See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text. See also Bydlon v. United States, 175 F.
Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (compensation awarded to owners of fly-in resorts in a national forest
whose businesses were destroyed by federal law prohibiting aircraft landings in the forest).
134. See notes 73-77 supra and accompanying text.
135. The principle of amortization need not be restricted to these types of cases. See notes
68-70 supra and accompanying text.
136. See Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of
Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727 (1967); Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 28 (1967). In the latter article the author

proposes a scheme of flexible administrative adjustment of claims against public agencies
through the use of inverse condemnation.
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swered. Until the legislatures have taken affirmative action in this respect,
the courts should attempt to achieve a fair result in each individual case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As concern for environmental quality grows, the necessity of land use
regulations to make the most efficient use of natural resources becomes more
apparent. There can be no doubt of the necessity for proper restrictions upon
land use. Nevertheless, however great this necessity, the fifth amendment
guarantee against the taking of private property for public use must be
preserved. When excessive restrictions are placed upon the use of property
for the benefit of the public, the individual landowner should not be forced to
bear more than his share of the cost of these benefits.
Obviously, the present system of challenging zoning ordinances is inadequate to effectuate these goals. Traditional remedies force the courts to make
zoning decisions by modifying or nullifying excessively burdensome use
restrictions. But this is not to say that allowing inverse condemnation is the
key. Admittedly, the extension of inverse condemnation to allow damage
suits in zoning litigation has its drawbacks. Even though neither remedy is
completely adequate, however, the courts could take an active role in reaching a compromise between the competing interests in "takings" controversies until legislatures see fit to enact zoning ordinances which provide for a
fair resolution of claims.

